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Abstract
In this paper we estimate a model where inflation, a measure of de facto central bank inde-
pendence and an index of de facto exchange rate regime are simultaneously determined by a set of
economic, political and institutional variables. De facto central bank independence is hampered by
socio-political turbulence and benefits from the balance of powers between the executive and the
parliament. Inflation is explained by de facto central bank independence, by the level and volatil-
ity of public expenditure and by the de facto exchange rate regime. Openness (real and financial)
affects inflation through the exchange rate regime channel. Success in controlling inflation, in turn
is crucial to sustain central bank independence and exchange rate stability.
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1 Introduction and motivation
A constitutional or institution design stage lays down some fun-
damental aspects of the rules of the game which cannot be easily
changed. Once an independent central bank has been set up, an
international agreement over the exchange rate has been signed, or
an inflation target has been explicitly assigned to the central bank,
it has some staying power, in the sense that change in institution
ex post is costly or takes time. Persson and Tabellini (2001), p.435
Research in political macroeconomics sees actual policies as endogenous
equilibrium outcomes. As the policy-making process depends on institutional
arrangements, fixing institutions is therefore crucial to improve policy out-
comes. This has well known consequences in monetary economics, where the
key implication of the Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983) time inconsistency approach is that central bank independence or a
fixed exchange rate are important tools to remove the inflation bias.
However, setting legal arrangements does not guarantee the desired policy
outcomes. For instance, it is difficult to detect a robust negative correlation
between indicators of de jure central bank independence and inflation beyond
the restricted sample of high income economies. Cukierman et al. (1992) show
instead that central bankers’ turnover rates, an indicator of de facto central
bank independence, explain cross-country inflation differentials. Similarly, the
announcement of a fixed exchange rate is not sufficient to discipline domestic
monetary policy as there are important differences between de jure and de
facto exchange rate regimes (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Alesina and Wagner,
2005; Carmignani et al., 2008).
We see two possible rationalisations for the apparent discrepancies between
some de jure institutions and de facto policies. The first is that, in prac-
tice, isolating monetary institutions from political pressure may be a difficult
task. For instance, empirical research supports the view that even in the US
there are indirect ways for politicians to affect monetary policy outcomes, de-
spite the independent status of the Fed (Alesina, 1987; Froyen et al., 1997;
Havrilesky, 1994; McGregor, 1996). The second stems from a rigourous exten-
sion of the time inconsistency approach (Bartolini and Drazen, 1997; Drazen,
1997; Drazen and Masson, 1994; Velasco and Neut, 2004), showing that in-
stitutions per se are not enough. Typically a tough policy today may worsen
the trade-off between credibility and flexibility tomorrow, possibly due to a
persistent unemployment increase or to debt accumulation. In this case even
an inflation averse policymaker may be induced to engage in expansionary
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policies.
Our work is based on the following premise: although well designed in-
stitutions are important to deliver low inflation, their de facto performance
is endogenous to the economic and socio-political environment. Thus we esti-
mate a model where inflation, a measure of de facto central bank independence
and an index of de facto exchange rate regime are simultaneously determined
by a set of economic, socio-political and institutional variables.
To our knowledge this is the first attempt to consider the structural interre-
lations between the socio-political environment, inflation and de facto policies.
We provide several contributions to the literature. First we find that inflation
is generally explained by three factors: the degree of central bank indepen-
dence, the exchange rate regime and fiscal policy. Second, success in reducing
inflation is crucial to support both central bank independence and exchange
rate stability. Third, socio-political factors do not have a direct impact on
inflation but affect the central bank turnover rate and, in turn, cause inflation.
As one might expect political turbulence hampers central bank independence.
The latter, instead, benefits from the balance of powers between the execu-
tive and the parliament: presidential systems are associated to lower central
bank independence. Fourth, there are open-economy aspects that affect infla-
tion beyond Romer’s (1993) trade-openness celebrated result. However, they
do not have a direct impact on inflation; instead they operate through the
exchange rate regime channel. For instance, financial markets integration is
associated with more stable exchange rates and, in turn, with lower inflation.
By contrast, financial fragility is associated with more flexible exchange rate
regimes, with adverse effects on inflation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the
major findings of the literature on the determinants of inflation, central bank
independence and openness. Section 3 illustrates the data set and the method-
ology used. Section 4 presents the empirical results; section 5 concludes.
2 Inflation, central bank independence and the
exchange rate regime
Empirical evidence on the determinants of inflation emphasises three key fac-
tors. The first is central bank de facto independence. Cukierman et al. (1992)
show that the central bank governor’s turnover rate affects the inflationary
outcome.1 However, they also suggest that ”...high inflation may encourage
1De jure independence (legal indicators) matters only for advanced economies.
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processes that make it easier for the government to influence monetary pol-
icy”, thus pointing to the joint endogeneity of inflation and independence.
In fact Cukierman (1992) (page 429) finds that there is a two way Granger-
causality between inflation and central bank independence as proxied by gov-
ernor’s turnover.
The second factor is openness. Romer (1993) suggests that the more the
economy is open, the more it will suffer from the real depreciation that high-
inflation equilibria bring about. Alfaro (2005), however, points out that the
commitment device role underlying Romer’s intuition is probably played by the
exchange rate regime rather than by trade openness per se`.2 Again, there are
reasons to believe that regime choice and inflation are jointly endogenous. On
the one hand high inflation countries should self-impose monetary discipline
by adopting fixed exchange rate regimes (see Calvo and Ve´gh, 1999 and the
vast literature on exchange rate stabilisation). On the other hand it is more
difficult to sustain a peg in a high inflation environment (Driffill and Miller,
1993). Whichever of the two effects prevails, it would be difficult to argue
that the regime choice is not influenced by inflationary outcomes. The third
factor is fiscal policy (Campillo and Miron, 1997). Alesina and Tabellini (1987)
point out that an inflation bias arises when distortionary taxation is necessary
to finance public expenditures. More recently, Dixit and Lambertini (2003b)
stress that in the presence of conflicting objectives between the central bank
and the fiscal authority, fiscal discretion may destroy monetary commitment
through its direct effect on inflation.
To account for endogeneity issues, we explicitly model the determinants
of central bank independence and exchange rate regime choice, while instru-
menting for fiscal policy variables. Our interpretation of de facto central bank
independence is inspired by the theoretical work of Lohmann (1992), who
characterises a regime of partial central bank independence where the govern-
ment always retains the option to override the central bank’s decisions at a
finite cost. She shows that in adverse circumstances the central bank inevitably
bends towards an accomodative monetary stance. Thus de facto independence
is determined by three clearly identifiable factors: i) changes in the “prefer-
ences” of the bank’s principal, possibly due to government turnover and to
socio-political instability;3 ii) changes in economic conditions; iii) changes in
institutional arrangements which shape the political system and determine
2A more radical criticism comes from Terra (1998) who argues that Romer’s effect could
be explained by the responses of severely indebted countries to the debt crises of the eighties.
3Lossani et al. (2000) have shown that under partial central bank independence, gov-
ernment turnover may generate monetary policy cycles when policymakers are ideologically
motivated.
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the relative strength and internal cohesion of the executive. Cross-country
empirical evidence on de facto central bank independence seems to confirm
the significant role of political forces (see for instance Cukierman and Webb
(1995) and Keefer and Stasavage, 2003).
With respect to the determinants of exchange rate regimes, we follow the
pioneering work of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
who identify de facto exchange rate regimes. In a similar setting Levy-Yeyati et
al. (2004) investigate the role of economic fundamentals, ranging from standard
optimal currency area theories to the more recent financial fragility approach.
The system for the simultaneous determination of inflation, de facto cen-
tral bank independence and de facto exchange rate regime can be written in
compact form:
Ay′ = Bx′ +Cz′ + ²′ (1)
Where y denotes a (row) vector defining inflation, central bank indepen-
dence and de facto exchange rate regime, x denotes a vector of economic
controls, z a vector of political and institutional factors, including fiscal policy
variables. Finally ² is the vector of error terms. Matrix A captures the simul-
taneous interaction among inflation, central bank independence and exchange
rate regime choice.
3 Data and methodology
Our data set covers economic political and institutional data for 79 countries
over the period 1970 - 2000. As we are not interested in short term effects, all
variables are five-year averages Economic data are drawn from standard sources
(IMF and World Bank). Political data are taken mainly from the Database
of Political Institutions (DPI), the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive
(CNTS), and Polity IV data set. The appendix provides a detailed description
of data sources, variable construction and the list of countries included in our
analysis.
3.1 Inflation and policy variables
Following Cukierman et al. (1992), to reduce heteroskedasticity problems we
use the index:
Inflation =
pi
1 + pi
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where pi is the annual inflation rate.4
We proxy the degree of de facto central bank independence with the turnover
rate of central bank governor (see Cukierman et al., 1992).
With regard to the de facto exchange rate regime variable, we use Reinhart
and Rogoff’s classification that infers the de facto regime from parallel mar-
ket exchange rates (variable defactoreg).5 The original classification groups
exchange rate regimes into 5 classes, coded from 1 to 5, denoting an increas-
ing level of flexibility. Technically class 4 identifies free floaters, while class
5 groups countries characterised by a combination of a free float and high
inflation (Reinhart and Rogoff define this regime as “freely falling”). Note
that this classification captures regime changes which are determined both by
policymakers’ decisions and by crisis-induced regime adjustments. What the
index cannot capture are the size effects of de facto devaluations. An analysis
of these effects is beyond the scope of the paper
Concern for the medium term effects of regime changes motivates our deci-
sion to take 5-year averages. This choice is not immune from criticism. In fact,
hyperinflation episodes and the associated freely falling exchange rate regimes
may affect results when their effects span over different 5-year observations.
To check for this we run the baseline model excluding periods of high inflation.
We will show that our results are not affected.
To identify the fiscal determinants of inflation we use both the level and the
volatility of government-consumption/GDP ratio (govfincon and volgovfincon
respectively). The first variable obviously identifies the Alesina and Tabellini
(1987) channel. The second is meant to capture the spirit of the Dixit and
Lambertini (2003b) fiscal policy effect on inflation. In addition, we consider
the possibility that public debt affects inflation, as in Campillo and Miron
(1997). In this regard, we experiment with two variables: a standard debt-to-
GDP ratio and a dummy (Ddebt) taking value 1 for severely indebted countries
(these are identified as in Terra (1998)).
3.2 Political and institutional variables
Lohmann’s (1992) model provides a useful reference for the identification of
politico-institutional mechanisms that affect de facto central bank indepen-
dence. In her framework, the central bank is partially independent because
its decisions can be overridden by a political principal (i.e. the government)
4Inflation (with the exception of cases of deflation) takes values between 0 and 1; a 100%
inflation rate corresponds an index value of 0.5.
5Alternatively, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) adopt a statistical approach based
on cluster analysis of the volatility of exchange rate and reserves.
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at a finite political cost. Therefore, whenever the preferred policy outcomes
of the principal are sufficiently different from those of the central bank, the de
facto independence of the latter is curtailed. Building on this interpretation,
de facto independence is crucially affected by those factors (or circumstances)
that create a tension between the bank and her principal about preferred poli-
cies. In our view two factors are likely to affect de facto independence: political
instability and institutional arrangements that shape the political system.
First, political instability shortens the time horizon of the incumbent and
lowers economic efficiency. As a result, political pressures for an accomodative
monetary stance increase and this should reduce de facto independence. Oper-
ationally, we consider two indicators of political instability. One is the expected
duration in office of the incumbent, proxied by the frequency of head-of-the-
executive changes (variable govter). The other is the degree of social unrest in
a country (variable sociopolrisk), measured as the principal component of var-
ious disaggregated indicators (assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare,
purges, riots, revolutions and anti-government demonstrations). The expected
coefficient on both variables is positive, denoting that de facto central bank
independence is lower in more unstable countries.
Second, political and institutional arrangements that determine the distri-
bution of political power and the fragmentation of decision-making are also
likely to affect de facto independence. In fact, the political cost of overrid-
ing central bank decisions is likely to increase when political power is more
dispersed, i.e. when enforcing a political threat to the central bank becomes
more difficult. In other words, we expect de facto independence to be higher
(and therefore central bank turnover to be lower) when the relative position
of the executive (the principal) is weaker. We will consider two indicators
of relative weakness (or strength) of the executive. The Herfindal index in
the government (herfgov)6 measures the concentration of the ruling coalition
and should display a positive coefficient in the central bank turnover regres-
sion. The variable system identifies different institutional settings (presiden-
tial, assembly-elected, and parliamentary), with higher values corresponding
to parliamentary regimes. Since parliamentary regimes imply a weaker posi-
tion for the executive, our hypothesis is that system should have a negative
effect.
6Formally defined as the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the government.
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3.3 Other economic variables
An important explanatory variable in our analysis is openness. We use two
complementary measures: the standard indicator of total trade volume to GDP
(open), and an index of capital account openness (kaopen), taken from Chinn
and Ito (2002). In both cases a higher value of the indicator denotes greater
openness.
We also consider a measure of liability dollarisation proxied by the ratio
of foreign liabilities over money (forliab).7 This will appear in the equation
explaining the choice of the exchange rate regime.
3.4 Methodology
Our choice of the estimation method is obviously driven by concern for the
endogeneity issue. We use continuous updating GMM and report 3SLS results
for robustness and comparison purposes. The system of equations has been es-
timated as a pooled cross section. The reason is that several institutional and
political variables vary much more across countries than over time, therefore
panel data models that focus on within-country variability (i.e. fixed effects)
do not seem appropriate. Moreover, we consider a large number of differ-
ent institutional and political factors which explain a great deal of countries’
heterogeneity.8
3.5 Instrument choice
In addition to the dependent variables of the system, we treat as endogenous
the variables defining the fiscal stance (both the level and the volatility of
government final consumption) and the measure of liability dollarisation. In
addition to the obvious theoretical reasons, the Hausman test always rejected
the null of exogeneity for these variables.
The presence of endogenous variables raises the question of instrument
validity. Finding good instruments is always difficult. A popular choice is
to use lagged values of the endogenous variables. However these are at best
weakly exogenous (see Lundberg and Squire (2003)).9
Therefore, in addition to the exogenous variables, we integrate the set of
instruments with some variables that are clearly exogenous such as a country’s
7We also experimented other other economic controls (i.e. GDP growth, level of devel-
opment) without finding significant effects.
8The same approach is followed by, among others, Alesina and Wagner (2005) and Lund-
berg and Squire (2003).
9The Sargan test often rejected the instrument validity when adding lagged values.
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distance from equator (see La Porta et al. (1999) for a discussion), time dum-
mies and two variables that capture the number constraints to the executive
(xrreg and polcon). Following Persson and Tabellini (2001) we instrument our
measures of the fiscal stance using institutional variables (i.e. polcon, xreg).
In addition we selected two measures of structural economic conditions (log
GNP per capita averaged over the entire sample, terms of trade growth) and
a measure (cycle) that captures the average cyclical position. This latter vari-
able, being averaged over five years, has an extremely low correlation with the
inflation rate (1.8%), but can be used as a good instrument for the volatility
of the fiscal spending.
We are then left with two questions. First, is our choice of instruments
good? Second, are there any other endogenous variables in the system? To
answer these questions we rely on a few tests. We run an F-test on the re-
gression of endogenous variables on instruments and we always reject the null
hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are jointly insignificant. Then, we
always run the Sargan test for instrument validity, and never reject the null
that our overidentifying restrictions are correct. Finally, we apply the Haus-
man test to check for the endogeneity of other regressors, always rejecting the
endogeneity hypothesis. Since we know little about the power of such tests in
the current context, we should interpret these results with caution. Still they
are consistent with our theoretical priors.
4 Results
Although we consider inflation, de facto central bank independence and the
de facto exchange rate regime as simultaneously determined, in presenting our
results we adopt a piecemeal approach. Thus we start with a single equa-
tion estimate for inflation, then we consider a two equation system explaining
inflation and central bank independence, finally we turn to the fully-fledged
three-equation system. This procedure helps the clarity the presentation of
the results and allows us on to show that the full system is consistently built.
In fact we will show that the basic results on the determinants of inflation
are robust to the inclusion of an additional equation for central bank indepen-
dence. Then, the results obtained in the two equation system are confirmed
when the full system is estimated.
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Table 1: Inflation equation
Variable Coeff. Std. Err.
Constant −0.218 (0.013)
CBturn 0.553∗∗∗ (0.149)
Open −0.169∗∗ (0.082)
Volgovfincon 0.735∗ (0.408)
Govfincon 1.176∗ (0.616)
Ddebt 0.051∗∗ (0.025)
N. Obs 419
J. Statistic 1.276
***, **, * denote significance level at 10, 5 and 1%. Dep. var.:
Volgovfincon Govfincon. Endogenous vars.: dep. var., Volgovfin-
con, Govfincon. Instruments: exogenous vars, cycle, sociopol-
risk, govter, average log gnp pro capite, latitude, time dummies.
Time dummies included but not reported. GMM White’s het-
erosckedasticity consistent estimates.
4.1 Inflation and central bank independence
The starting point in our analysis is a single-equation estimate of inflation in
line with the existing literature.
Inflationi,t =β0 + β1CBturni,t + β2Openi,t + β3Govfinconi,t
+ β4V olgovfinconi,t + β5Ddebti,t + ²i,t
(2)
Consistently with the discussion in section 3.2, at this stage we assume
that institutional and socio-political variables affect inflation through their
influence on de facto central bank independence. Therefore we use them as
instruments.10 We will relax this assumption later in this section.
The results presented in table 1 are broadly in line with previous empirical
evidence (Campillo and Miron, 1997; Romer, 1993). Inflation is positively
related to central banker turnover and to both measures of the fiscal stance,11
and is negatively affected by openness. Finally, in line with Terra (1998), we
also find that, beyond a certain threshold, the level of debt affects inflation.12
10See see table 1 for the detailed list of instruments. The Hausman test confirms the
endogeneity of the instrumented variables. The same test also confirms that openness is
exogenous, supporting our modeling choice.
11We checked for multicollinearity between the two measures of fiscal policy. Results of
this and the next paragraphs appear to be immune from this problem.
12We could not find evidence of a systematic relation between the debt-to-GDP ratio and
inflation.
9
Carmignani et al.: Economic and Socio-Political Determinants
Brought to you by | University of Queensland (University of Queensland)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 1/19/12 7:31 AM
The next step is to characterise the simultaneous interaction between cen-
tral bank policies and inflation outcomes. In fact, as already noted by Cukier-
man et al. (1992), “less central bank independence contributes to higher in-
flation ... high inflation may encourage processes that make it easier for the
government to influence monetary policy” resulting in a faster central banker
turnover.
We therefore estimate a two-equation system based on equation 2 and:
CBturni,t =γ0 + γ1Inflationi,t + γ2Govteri,t
+ γ3Systemi,t + γ2Sociopolriski,t + γ5Herfgovi,t + ηi,t
(3)
Table 2 presents the results. Our single-equation estimates for inflation
are confirmed, with the exception of the debt variable. Turning to the second
equation, we find that inflation does indeed affect the central banker turnover
rate. Political and institutional variables also matter, and the results confirm
our priors. Political and socio-political instability (variables govter and so-
ciopolrisk) induce a higher turnover rate. The negative sign associated with
system suggests that the central bank is de facto less independent when the
executive is stronger vis a` vis the parliament. In this regard, our findings
integrate an established view about the economic efficiency of political sys-
tems. In fact Persson and Tabellini (2001) argue that in presidential systems,
where governments are more accountable to the electorate, the level of pub-
lic expenditure and distortionary taxation is lower. This in turn should limit
inflationary pressures. Our estimates, instead, highlight that presidential sys-
tems are associated to lower central bank independence with adverse effects
on inflation.
Finally, the variable herfgov has a positive and (marginally) significant
sign: when the composition of the executive is relatively more homogeneous,
government’s ability to put pressure on the central bank increases, and central
bank independence de facto falls.
So far we have implicitly assumed that political and institutional variables
affect the inflation rate only through the degree of central bank independence.
To check whether these variables also have a direct effect on inflation, we have
estimated the system by adding political variables directly to the inflation
equation. As shown by columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 in table 2 these variables are
never significant.
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Table 2: Two equation system: inflation, central banker turnover rate
Variable Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6
Dep Var: Inflation
Constant −0.155∗ −0.174∗ −0.149∗ −0.131 −0.204∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.089) (0.088) (0.084) (0.102) (0.055)
CBturn 0.504∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.143) (0.117) (0.112) (0.119) (0.094)
Volgovfincon 0.910∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗ 0.851∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.344) (0.363) (0.303) (0.313) (0.243)
Govfincon 0.797∗∗ 0.933∗∗ 0.760∗ 0.797∗∗ 0.930∗∗ 0.362∗
(0.360) (0.391) (0.401) (0.345) (0.406) (0.216)
Defactoreg 0.055∗∗∗
(0.009)
Open −0.163∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.051
(0.060) (0.065) (0.066) (0.058) (0.065) (0.056)
Ddebt 0.023 0.012 0.023 0.021 0.024 0.006
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.018)
Pol. Control −0.096 −0.003 −0.009 0.027
(0.074) (0.008) (0.011) (0.031)
Dep Var: Cbturn
Constant 0.062 0.055 0.061 0.050 0.076∗ 0.071∗
(0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045) (0.039)
Inflation 0.534∗∗ 0.538∗∗ 0.553∗∗ 0.590∗∗ 0.491∗ 0.538∗∗∗
(0.272) (0.263) (0.278) (0.279) (0.278) (0.120)
Govter 0.260∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.090) (0.091) (0.089) (0.091) (0.074)
System −0.039∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.033∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.013)
Sociopolrisk 0.023∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Herfgov 0.058∗ 0.054∗ 0.057∗ 0.057∗ 0.044 0.023
(0.034) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034)
Continued on the next page
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Variable Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6
System obs 412 412 412 412 412 379
N. obs eq1 364 364 364 364 364 340
N. obs eq2 412 412 412 412 412 379
J statistic 15.043 13.786 15.147 14.583 13.957 13.514
Pol. Control: Col 2 = Govter, Col 3 = Sociopolrisk, Col 4 = System, Col 5 = Herfgov.
GMM White’s heterosckedasticity consistent estimates. Time dummies included but not
reported. Endogenous variables: dependent variables, Volgovfincon Govfincon. Instruments:
exogenous regressors, time dummies, latitude, cycle, average log gnp pro capite, polcon,
xrreg, terms of trade growth.
Similarly we also added the fiscal variables to equation 3, in order to detect
any additional fiscal policy effect on central bank independence. The estimated
coefficients were never significant whereas previous findings were confirmed
(results available upon request).
Summing up, the estimate of the two-equation system confirms the hypoth-
esis of a simultaneous determination of de facto central bank independence and
inflation. Moreover, institutional and political factors affect inflation through
their influence on de facto central bank independence:
• Socio-political instability increases the governor’s turnover rate.
• More stable governments are associated to greater central bank indepen-
dence.
• Stronger concentration of the decision-making power in the hands of the
government reduces de facto central bank independence.
4.2 Openness and the exchange rate regime
We now address the role of openness in determining inflation. From the infla-
tion equation, we have so far omitted the exchange rate regime variable, that
could in principle interact with both inflation and the degree of openness. In-
cluding the de facto exchange rate regime variable (defactoreg) in the inflation
equation - column 6 in table 2 - we see that open loses significance.
These results confirm Alfaro’s (2005) finding that the role of commitment
device is primarily played by the exchange rate regime and not by openness.
Moreover we now reject Terra’s (1998) criticism as the debt dummy is never
significant.
Theoretical priors and empirical evidence (Husain et al., 2005) suggest
that the exchange rate regime should in fact be treated as endogenous to the
12
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inflationary outcome. To account for this, we estimate a 3-equation system,
including (2),13 (3) and a third equation estimating the determinants of the
exchange rate regime choice:
Defactoregi,t = δ0+δ1Inflationi,t+δ2Openi,t+δ3Forliabi,t+δ1Kaopeni,t+ui,t
(4)
Following the literature,14 we assume that the exchange rate regime is
related to some economic controls (capturing optimum currency area and fi-
nancial fragility theories), and to inflation. We treat the currency mismatch
indicator (forliab) as potentially endogenous15 while the index of capital con-
trols (kaopen) is assumed exogenous to the de facto regime, as in Levy-Yeyati
et al. (2004). In our specification cbturn affects defactoreg through the rate of
inflation. However we also checked for an additional direct effect of de facto
central bank independence on the exchange rate regime, but the cbturn co-
efficient into the exchange rate regime equation was not significant (results
available upon request).16
Table 3 presents the result of the 3 equation system. After the introduction
of the exchange rate regime equation, inflation is now determined by de facto
central bank independence, by the fiscal variables (govfincon and volgovfincon),
and by defactoreg. Our previous findings on the determinants of central bank
independence are confirmed, with the exception of herfgov that now loses
significance.
13After controlling for the exchange rate regime, openness is never significant in any of
our specification of the inflation equation. Therefore we dropped it from equation (2), along
with the debt dummy.
14See Alesina and Wagner (2005); Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004); Carmignani et al. (2008)
15The Hausman test confirmed our prior.
16Berger et al. (2000), in a single equation framework find a positive effect of cbturn on the
probability of observing a peg. However their emphasis is on de jure exchange rate regimes
and they do not explicitly model the link between central bank independence, inflation and
the exchange rate regime.
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Table 3: Three equation system: inflation, central banker turnover rate, de
facto exchange rate regime
Variable Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4
Dep Var: Inflation
Constant −0.235∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.098∗
(0.051) (0.055) (0.069) (0.053)
CBturn 0.324∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.075) (0.094) (0.085)
Volgovfincon 0.716∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.181) (0.191) (0.147)
Govfincon 0.325∗ 0.127 0.468∗∗ 0.034
(0.192) (0.197) (0.233) (0.168)
Defactoreg 0.074∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
Dep Var: Cbturn
Constant 0.086∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.074∗
(0.038) (0.044) (0.038) (0.038)
Inflation 0.509∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.192) (0.169) (0.175)
Govter 0.279∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.075) (0.077) (0.079)
System −0.042∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.040∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Sociopolrisk 0.027∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Herfgov 0.029 0.042 0.016 0.061∗
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
Dep Var: Defactoreg
Constant 1.888∗∗∗ 1.855∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗ 1.537∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.191) (0.176) (0.227)
Continued on the next page
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Variable Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4
Open −1.733∗∗∗ −1.636∗∗∗ −1.736∗∗∗ −1.312∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.363) (0.343) (0.319)
Forliab 0.566∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.150) (0.149) (0.134)
Kaopen −0.191∗∗∗ −0.094∗ −0.091 −0.171∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.055) (0.069) (0.058)
Inflation 4.760∗∗∗ 5.117∗∗∗ 4.190∗∗∗ 5.793∗∗∗
(0.866) (0.871) (1.087) (1.965)
System obs 475 475 472 471
N. obs eq1 330 330 330 292
N. obs eq2 388 388 388 390
N. obs eq3 400 400 397 349
J Statistic 25.81 NA 29.44 29.91
Eq1: baseline, Eq2 baseline 3SLS, Eq3 baseline with new definition of Defactoreg, Eq4:
baseline excluding high inflation. GMM White’s heterosckedasticity consistent estimates.
Time dummies included but not reported. Endogenous variables: dependent variables, Vol-
govfincon Govfincon, Forliab. Instruments: exogenous regressors, time dummies, latitude,
cycle, average log gnp pro capite, Ddebt, polcon, xrreg (excluded in eq 4), terms of trade
growth.
Turning to the exchange rate regime equation, we obtain the following
results:
• High inflation calls for de facto flexibility.
• More open economies are associated with more fixed exchange rate regimes.
Thus we confirm an indirect link between trade openness and inflation.
• In contrast with conventional wisdom (i.e. the impossible trinity theo-
rem), the capital account openness indicator (kaopen) is positively re-
lated to the propensity to peg. This result, which is akin to Levy-Yeyati
et al. (2004), could be explained by the attempt of many countries to
attract capital flows by integrating in the international financial markets
and using the peg to stabilise expectations, with beneficial effects on
inflation.
• Unlike Alesina and Wagner (2005), we find that liability dollarisation is
associated with greater de facto flexibility. Recent contributions (Eichen-
green and Hausmann, 2005; Hausmann et al., 2001) suggest that coun-
tries facing high risks of adverse balance sheet effects are more reluctant
15
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to float. However, a natural extension of this argument would be that,
over the medium term, economies who cannot escape financial fragility
are less likely to sustain a stable exchange rate. As variables are five-year
averages, this could be the driving factor behind our results.
Summing up, we find that open economy aspects affect inflation through
the de facto exchange rate regime choice. It seems that the traditional trade
openness channel is only part of the story: financial markets integration and
financial fragility also play a significant role.
4.3 Robustness checks
As mentioned in section 3, 3SLS may have better finite sample properties
than GMM estimates under the assumption of heteroskedasticity. We have
therefore re-estimated the 3-equation system using 3SLS. Column 2 in table
Table 3 shows that the results are confirmed with the exception of coefficients
on govfincon in the inflation equation.
Within the variable defactoreg, freely floating exchange rate regimes are
treated as distinct from “freely falling”, the latter identied by Reinhart and
Rogoff (2004) as countries with flexible exchange rates and high inflation. This
“artificial distinction” among flexible exchange rate regimes could affect some
of our results. We therefore recoded defactoreg, grouping freely floating and
freely falling regimes into a single category. The results (column 3 in table 3)
show no significant change with respect to the benchmark equation, with the
exception of kaopen in the exchange rate equation.
We also checked whether the effect of cbturn on inflation might be driven
by high inflation countries, as suggested by de Haan and Kooi (2000). In
column 4 in table 3 we show the results for the 3-equation system where we
have excluded high-inflation countries.17 All variables remain significant with
the exception of govfincon in the inflation equation.
Although defactoreg can take any value between 1 and 5, persistency in
exchange rate regime choices could generate clustering around the originally
coded values. In principle this could induce a distortion similar to the intro-
duction of a categorical dependent variable. A similar argument can be applied
to cbturn. To check for this we estimated an ordered logit single equation for
defactoreg and for cbturn obtaining results (available upon request) that are
identical to those in column 1 of table 3.
17This is equivalent to estimate the system of equations without freely falling regimes in
defactoreg variable.
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Table 4: Central bank independence: the role of industrialised countries
Variable Col1 Variable Col2
Dep Var: Inflation
Constant −0.241∗∗∗ Constant −0.326∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.061)
CBturnnonind 0.288
∗∗∗ CBturn 0.295∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.065)
CBturnind −0.067
(0.181)
(0.158)
Volgovfincon 0.152 Volgovfincon −0.005
(0.281) (0.311)
Govfincon 0.631∗∗ Govfincon 0.837∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.282)
Defactoreg 0.091∗∗∗ Defactoreg 0.091∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013)
Dnonind 0.076∗∗
(0.030)
Dep Var: Cbturn
Constant 0.052 Constant 0.030
(0.036) (0.041)
Inflation 0.798∗∗∗ Inflation 0.704∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.166)
Govter 0.224∗∗∗ Govter 0.263∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.081)
System −0.021 System −0.020
(0.014) (0.013)
Sociopolrisk 0.023∗∗∗ Sociopolrisk 0.021∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Herfgov 0.005 Herfgov 0.021
Continued on the next page
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Variable Col1 Variable Col2
(0.035) (0.034)
Dnonind 0.025
(0.030)
Dep Var: Defactoreg
Constant 1.780∗∗∗ Constant 1.769∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.202)
Open −1.492∗∗∗ Open −1.585∗∗∗
(0.329) (0.367)
Forliab 0.419∗∗∗ Forliab 0.449∗∗
(0.117) (0.184)
Kaopen −0.130∗∗∗ Kaopen −0.119∗∗
(0.047) (0.048)
Inflation 5.855∗∗∗ Inflation 5.688∗∗∗
(0.700) (0.757)
Dnonind 0.053
(0.184)
System obs 475 475
N. obs eq1 330 330
N. obs eq2 388 388
N. obs eq3 400 400
J Statistic 33.32 33.68
GMM White’s heterosckedasticity consistent estimates. Time dummies included but
not reported. Endogenous variables: dependent variables, Volgovfincon Govfincon,
Forliab. Instruments: exogenous regressors, time dummies, latitude, cycle, average
log gnp pro capite, Ddebt, polcon, xrreg, terms of trade growth.
Finally we tested whether Cbturn has a differential effect on inflation in
industrialised countries. We carried out the analysis in two steps. First, in the
inflation equation, we interacted Cbturn with two dummies for industrialised
(Dind) and non industrialised countries (Dnonind).
Table 4 shows that while Cbturnnonind remains positive and significant,
Cbturnind is non-significant, while all other results are broadly confirmed. In
the second step we checked the global effect of the distinction between indus-
trialised and non-industrialised countries. In the second column of table 4
we re-estimated the baseline model by adding a dummy for non-industrialised
countries in every equation. The results broadly confirm our original findings.
Note that the country dummy is significant only in the inflation equation.
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These results are open to two different interpretations: on the one hand in
industrialised countries Cbturn could be a poor proxy for de facto indepen-
dence.18 On the other hand industrialised countries might be characterised by
intrinsic preferences for low inflation (Posen, 1993). We leave this issue for
future research.
5 Conclusions
Previous empirical research has pointed out that de jure monetary institutions
may fail to deliver the expected outcomes. This could be explained by the
endogeneity of monetary institutions to the economic environment. Notwith-
standing the obvious caution in identifying causal relationships through the
analysis of cross country data, our findings are consistent with our theoretical
priors and convey a simple message: inflation and de facto monetary institu-
tions are simultaneously determined and react to a set of “fundamentals”, i.e.
fiscal policy, socio-political stability, the underlying institutional arrangements
and open economy aspects.
Such “fundamentals” operate through distinct and clearly identified chan-
nels. We broadly confirm the Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) argument that
fiscal discretion may destroy monetary commitment through its direct effect
on inflation. Socio-political and institutional factors affect inflation through
their influence on de facto central bank independence. We also find that, in
addition to trade openness, financial institutions matter. In fact, integration
with international capital markets has double-edged effects on inflation. On
the one hand, it induces monetary policy to stabilise the exchange rate. On
the other hand, when things go wrong, financial fragility makes stable ex-
change rates unsustainable and triggers adverse inflation equilibria. After the
Argentinean disaster this might not come as a surprise.
18We are grateful to Alex Cukierman for raising this point.
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Table 5: Descriptive stats: all countries
Var. Mean SD. Dev Min 25 50 75 Max N.Obs.
CBturn 0.24 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 1.40 633
Inflation 0.12 0.14 −0.05 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.92 979
Cycle 0.50 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.60 1.00 980
Defactoreg 2.31 1.23 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 717
Forliab 0.88 1.05 0.02 0.23 0.51 1.06 7.00 710
Govter 0.16 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 1.00 947
Herfgov 0.83 0.27 0.00 0.67 1.0 1.0 1.0 814
Kaopen −0.04 1.46 −1.79 −1.09 −0.47 0.99 2.66 773
Lat 0.28 0.19 0.01 0.13 0.24 0.44 0.72 978
Open 0.39 0.23 0.06 0.22 0.32 0.52 1.35 860
Polity −0.43 7.49 −10.00 −7.00 −3.80 8.00 10.00 866
Sociopolrisk 0.02 1.14 −0.72 −0.72 −0.44 0.26 9.96 881
System 0.81 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.60 2.00 2.00 789
Ttg 0.01 0.08 −0.17 −0.02 0.00 0.03 1.06 971
Volgovfincon 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.45 789
Govfincon 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.31 795
Polcon 0.26 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.89 870
Loggnppc 7.23 1.35 4.64 6.14 7.14 8.18 9.95 954
Xrreg 2.34 0.59 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 866
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Table 6: List of countries
Algeria Estonia Korea Romania
Argentina Finland Kyrgyz Rep. Russia
Armenia France Latvia Slovak Rep.
Australia Gambia Lesotho Slovenia
Austria Ghana Libya South Africa
Azerbaijan Greece Lithuania Spain
Belarus Guatemala Malawi Sri Lanka
Belgium Haiti Malaysia Swaziland
Bolivia Honduras Mauritius Syria
Brazil Hungary Mexico Tanzania
Chile Iceland Moldova Thailand
China Indonesia Morocco Turkey
Colombia Iran Nepal Uganda
Costa Rica Ireland Netherlands United Kingdom
Cyprus Israel New Zealand United States
Czech Rep. Italy Nigeria Uruguay
Denmark Jamaica Pakistan Venezuela
Dominican Rep Jordan Peru Zambia
Ecuador Kazakhstan Philippines Zimbabwe
Egypt Kenya Portugal
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Data source
Economic Variables
Variable Description Source
Corrinf Inflation (scaled) IFS line 64
CBturn Central bank turnover rate Ghosh et. al 2002
Defactoreg Index of de facto exchange
rate regime
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
Forliab Foreign liabilities over money
(lagged)
IFS line 16c + line 26c
Kaopen Capital account openness in-
dex
Authors’ calculation based
on Chinn and Ito (2002)
Open Openness, imports + ex-
ports/2gdp
WDI
Gdpg Gdp growth WDI
Govfincon Government final consump-
tion over GDP
WDI
Volgovfincon Volatility of government fi-
nal consumption over GDP,
5-year moving standard devi-
ation
WDI
Cycle Log deviations from HP
trend
Authors’ calculations from
WDI data
Ttg Terms of trade growth WDI
Lat Latitude La Porta et. al. (1999)
Loggnppc Log GNP per capita WDI
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Political Variables
Variable Description Source
System Typology of political system DPI
Ass Assassinations CNTS archive
Genstr General Strikes CNTS archive
Guerwar Guerrilla Warfare CNTS archive
Purg Purges CNTS archive
Riots Riots CNTS archive
Revol Revolutions CNTS archive
Agdem Anti-Government Demonstrations CNTS archive
Sociopolrisk index of socio political risk, first prin-
cipal component of: Ass, Genstr,
Guerwar, Purg, Riots, Revol, Agdem
Authors’ calculation
Govter measure of political change. Records
the change in either the executive or
in the institutional system or in the
ideological orientation of the execu-
tive
Authors’ calculations
Herfgov Herfindal Index for government DPI
xrreg Regulation of executive recruitment POLITY IV
Polcon Political constraint index Witold Henisz
Dataset References
Chinn and Ito financial openness measure: Cinn M., Ito I., “What Mat-
ters for Financial Development? Capital Controls, Institutions, and Interac-
tions,” Journal of Development Economics, forthcoming.
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/∼mchinn/research.html
CNTS Dataset: Banks, A., “Cross-National Time Series Database”.
http://www.databanks.sitehosting.net
DPI 2000: Beck T., Keefer P., and Clarke G., “Database of Political Institu-
tions”.
http://www.worldbank.org
Ghosh et. al. Dataset: Ghosh A., Gulde A.M., Wolf H. “Exchange Rate
Regimes, Choices and Consequences”, MIT Press, 2002.
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IFS: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 2004,
CD Rom.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm
La Porta et. al. dataset: La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., Shleifer A.,
Vishny R., “The Quality of Government”, Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, 1999.
http://www.andrei-shleifer.com/data.html
Polity IV Project: Monty G. Marshall M. and Jaggers K. “Political Regime
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2003”.
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
Political Constraint Index: Henisz W. “The Institutional Environment for
Economic Growth”, Economics and Politics 2000.
http://www.management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/POLCON
Reinhart and Rogoff exchange rate regime classification: Reinhart C.,
Rogoff K. “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinter-
pretation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004.
http://www.wam.umd.edu/∼creinhar/Links.html
WDI: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004, Washington, DC:
The World Bank.
http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/
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